Weighted Voting for the U.N. Power Struggle

A Group of 77 developing nations (G77) was organized in June, 1964 in the General Assembly (GA) to “…enhance its joint negotiating capacity…”   The G77 now includes 132 nations.  On April 28, 108 of the G77 together with China voted to table major parts of Secretary General Kofi Annan’s blueprint for U.N. management reform.  The United States led 50 nations that voted against the tabling resolution.  The G77 explained the reasons for their negative vote.  The major one was the perception that the proposed reforms are part of a larger strategy by the major donor countries, primarily the U.S., to assure tighter control of the U.N. internally.  The U.S. responded : “Absent top to bottom management reform, the United Nations will continue to be ill-equipped to meet the current demands that we as member states place upon the organization.”   We see merit in both positions.

Since 1945 the GA, has been envisioned as the world’s legislature.  But it still has no authority other than to manage the internal operations of the United Nations.  It has no international power because its voting system does not reflect reality.  The smallest island member-nation has the same one vote as does China and the United States: one member, one vote (OMOV).  Until each of the member nations in the GA can play some important role, many will continue to “act out” in a way that may appear to be negative and irresponsible.  Now is the time to consider equipping the GA with a system of representation that will not only reflect the sovereign equality of each member but also the wide differences among the members in population and financial strength.   At Philadelphia in 1787 the Connecticut Compromise solved the problem of legislative representation with a bi-cameral Congress.  The GA does not need a House and a Senate but does require an equitable Weighted Voting (WV) plan (NJLJ, 5/26/03).  WV is used in different forms in all international financial and certain other specialized organizations.  

The Binding Triad (BT) was devised by the late Richard Hudson, founder of the Center for War/Peace Studies.  Decisions utilizing the BT would still be made with a single vote but with three simultaneous majorities within that vote.  The size of the majorities on the second and third leg of the Triad would be negotiated before the plan is adopted.  A computer would instantaneously report whether the resolution has the support of: (1) two thirds of the nations present and voting; (2) nations representing the agreed upon majority of the world’s population; and (3) nations representing the agreed upon majority of the U.N. budget.   So as to assure the G77 that the BT would deprive the members of nothing, its present ability to pass non-binding resolutions and to control the internal affairs of the U.N. including the budget by the OMOV system would be retained.  Also, the BT provides that no member nation would have more than a vote of 15% on either the population or the contribution leg of the Triad.

While the BT proposal need not be adopted in its precise original form, its study should stimulate much needed reform in the powers, decision-taking and even the composition of the General Assembly.   The power struggle on April 28 demonstrates the need for sharing of power in the GA.  U.N. charter amendment  to provide for weighted voting later in this decade would come none too soon.

Editorial from the New Jersey Law Journal published May 8, 2006. The Law Journal is New Jersey's oldest and largest lawyers weekly news publication.