The Binding Triad

Weighted voting, which is used in different forms in all international financial and certain other specialized organizations, should be introduced in suitable form into the General Assembly. Only population and financial contributions to the UN commend themselves, though the raw data may have to be adapted for such use. The Binding Triad (BT) proposal would give the Assembly the power to adopt international legislation, provided it does so by a voting system that requires majorities to be attained by votes calculated on the one-member-one-vote (OMOV) or (1) “sovereignty” basis as well as by votes weighted according to (2) population and (3) UN contributions. While the BT proposal may not be approved in its precise original form, its study should stimulate much needed reform in the powers, decision-taking and even the composition of the General Assembly.

In order for a resolution dealing with a truly global problem to become law (replacing the need for treaties) it must reflect the following majorities on each leg of the Triad: (1) Sovereignty: the present requirement of two thirds of the nations present and voting; (2) Population: nations reflecting some majority (51% or more) of the world’s population; and (3) Contributions: nations representing some majority of the UN budget. No matter what a nation’s population or contribution to the budget, no nation may have more than a 15% vote on the 2^nd or 3^rd legs of the Triad.

To demonstrate to the smaller nations that they are losing nothing by supporting the BT, the present two third’s vote would continue to be sufficient to pass a non-binding resolution. The small nations would, however, be gaining real power in the new GA legislative process because nothing could be enacted without a two-thirds vote on the first leg. It is good to recall that the General Assembly may pass a BT amendment to the Charter without the support of the P5.  However the ratification process will require ratification by the P5. That scenario occurred in 1963-65 when the proposal to enlarge the SC and ECOSOC did not have the support of the P5 in the Assembly vote but after it was sent to the nations for ratification, one by one each of the P5 ratified. The first four did so in the belief that their interests would be served by the refusal of the U.S. to ratify. Each of the other four wanted the other nations to not blame them for the failure to enact the SC and ECOSOC enlargements. When President Johnson learned what had happened and why, he took the matter to the Senate where he obtained its ratification.